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Michigan v. Environmental Protection Agency, 576 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2699 
(2015) 
 
Lindsay P. Ward 
 
 What’s the price of clean air? The Supreme Court found that the EPA, 
tasked with setting limits on hazardous pollutants, unreasonably declined to 
consider cost when regulating power plant emissions under the Clean Air Act. 42 
U.S.C. § 7412 gives the EPA the authority to regulate power plants under the 
Clean Air Act as long as the Agency finds that “regulation is appropriate and 
necessary.” In the instant case, the EPA concluded that regulation met both these 
requirements. Finding the agency’s decision unreasonable, the majority struck 
down the EPA’s rule. The minority, however, asserted that the decision was 
unsound; it overlooked the intent of Congress and will likely have costly 
repercussions. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The petitioners, a group including twenty-three states, brought suit 
against the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”).1 They claimed that the 
EPA refused to consider cost when making the determination to regulate power 
plants. 2  Michigan v. Environmental Protection Agency examined the current 
understanding of the EPA’s authority to regulate hazardous air pollutants. 3  
According to the majority opinion, the issue before the Supreme Court of the 
United States was whether the EPA unreasonably refused to consider cost when 
setting power plant emission standards.4 The EPA is only able to regulate if the 
action is deemed “appropriate and necessary.”5 However, the EPA must take into 
account certain relevant factors when making this determination, including the 
aspect of cost.6 The Court concluded that the EPA ignored cost and that this was 
an unreasonable interpretation.7 In a concurrence penned by Justice Thomas, by 
contrast, it was the practice of applying Chevron deference to agency action itself 
in question.8 The dissent found that the majority opinion missed the mark; the 
concern was if the “EPA acted reasonably in structuring its regulatory process.”9 
Delving into the complete regulatory process, the dissent asserted that the EPA 
did eventually consider cost, even if it was not one of its primary deliberations.10  
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II.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 The Clean Air Act (“CAA”) charges the EPA with regulating emissions 
of hazardous air pollutants.11 Established by the CAA, the National Emissions 
Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutant Program—also known as the hazardous-
air-pollutants program—focuses on stationary-source emissions. 12  However, 
power plants are held to distinct regulatory requirements under the Clean Air Act 
Amendments of 1990.13 The EPA must first conduct a study of any public health 
risks “reasonably anticipated to occur as a result of emissions by [power plants] 
of [hazardous air pollutants].”14 If, after completion of the study, the EPA finds 
that “regulation is appropriate and necessary,” it is given the authority to regulate 
power plants under 42 U.S.C. § 7412.15  
 The EPA conducted the required study in 1998 and concluded that it had 
the authority to regulate coal- and oil-fired power plants in 2000.16 It deemed 
regulation “appropriate” because of public health and environment risks that may 
be a consequence of the plants’ emissions, and “because controls capable of 
reducing these emissions were available.” 17  The regulation was “necessary” 
because even after enforcing other CAA conditions, these hazards still existed.18 
Crucially, the EPA stated that when making the determination of whether power 
plants fell under § 7412 regulation, “costs should not be considered.”19  
 The EPA also issued a “Regulatory Impact Analysis,” which found that 
power plants would expend $9.6 billion per year to follow the proposed 
regulations. 20  Acknowledging that computing the benefits of reducing power 
plants’ emissions of hazardous emissions was not precise, the EPA stated that “to 
the extent it could, it estimated that these benefits were worth $4 to $6 million 
per year.” 21 Additional benefits, including reducing emissions not under the 
hazardous-air-pollutants program, were also addressed. 22  While the EPA’s 
“appropriate-and-necessary finding did not rest on these ancillary effects . . . the 
regulatory impact analysis took them into account, increasing the Agency’s 
estimate of the quantifiable benefits of its regulation to $37 to $90 billion per 
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year.”23 However, the regulatory impact analysis “played no role” in the EPA’s 
decision to regulate power plants.24  
Requesting review of the EPA’s new rule regarding coal- and oil-fired 
power plants, the petitioners first brought suit in United States District Court for 
the District of Columbia.25 Comprised of twenty-three different states, the Utility 
Air Regulatory Group, and the National Mining Association, the petitioners 
disputed the new rule, asserting that the Agency acted unreasonably when it 
decided to ignore cost. The United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit 
affirmed the EPA’s decision.26 The Supreme Court granted certiorari together 
with two other cases.27 
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
 
A.  Majority Opinion 
 
Federal agencies must employ “reasoned decisionmaking” when issuing 
new regulations.28 The Court’s opinion, penned by Justice Scalia, focused on 
whether the complete disregard of the cost of the proposed regulation was 
reasonable.29 The Court applied Chevron deference, which charges courts with 
deferring to an agency’s expertise and knowledge when that agency is 
interpreting ambiguous legislation.30 Chevron deference does not, however, give 
an agency license to issue arbitrary or unreasoned decisions.31 The Court found 
that in this case, the EPA “strayed far beyond those bounds when it read § 
7412(n)(1) to mean that it could ignore cost when deciding whether to regulate 
power plants.”32    
The Court determined that treatment of power plants diverges from the 
CAA’s management of other sources.33 The CAA gives the EPA the authority to 
regulate power plants if the EPA determines regulation to be “appropriate and 
necessary” under § 7412(n)(1)(A), while directing with set criteria the regulation 
of other sources.34 Justice Scalia found that though the phrase “appropriate and 
necessary” left much room for agency interpretation, the EPA’s understanding 
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  77 Fed. Reg. 9306. 
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  Brief for Fed. Resp’ts at 14, Mich. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 135 S. Ct. 2699 
(2015) (Nos. 14-46, 14-47, 14-49). 
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  White Stallion Energy Ctr., LLC v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 748 F.3d 1222 (D.C. 
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went too far.35 The majority further found that levying regulations that would 
cost power plants billions of dollars to save “a few dollars in health or 
environmental benefits” was illogical, and far from appropriate.36  The Court 
acknowledged that there may be some situations in which it is reasonable not to 
consider cost under the phrase “appropriate and necessary,” but stated that “this 
is not one of them.”37 The Court determined that cost, an important factor in the 
decisions of other agencies, should certainly be considered by EPA in regulating 
coal- and oil-fired power plants.38  
The Court took particular offense to the EPA's interpretation of § 
7412(n)(1)(B), which had concluded that Congress intended attention be given to 
environmental effects but not to cost.39 Chevron deference, the Court held, does 
not stretch that far; while agencies may adopt one reasonable interpretation of a 
statute even though an equally reasonable alternative exists, Chevron “does not 
license interpretative gerrymanders under which an agency keeps parts of 
statutory context it likes while throwing away parts it does not.”40  Ancillary 
benefits, addressed in a Regulatory Impact Analysis, were not enough to uphold 
the EPA’s decision, as the EPA did not use those additional benefits as a basis for 
its decision, and therefore the Court could consider those benefits in its holding.41 
Comparing the EPA’s reasoning to a Ferrari buyer who purchases the vehicle 
with no thought towards cost because that deliberation will happen “later when 
deciding whether to upgrade the sound system,” the Court reversed and 
remanded, concluding that the EPA’s interpretation of § 7412(n)(1)(A) as 
omitting cost analysis was unreasonable.42 
B.  Justice Thomas’s Concurrence 
 
The issue in the case for Justice Thomas was the application of Chevron 
deference.43 In Justice Thomas’s view, applying this standard of review takes the 
authority to interpret the law away from the courts and instead allows agencies to 
make their own determinations.44 To Justice Thomas, indirectly, vaguely worded 
statutes allow agencies “to formulate legally binding rules to fill in gaps based on 
policy judgments” and bypass both Congress and the courts.45 Justice Thomas 
asserted that this practice conflicts with Article I of the United States 
Constitution, which imbues Congress with “all legislative Powers.” 46  Justice 
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Thomas found the EPA's belief that it was entitled to deference distressing, and 
courts should be wary of this practice, as “it is the power to decide—without any 
particular fidelity to the text—which policy goals EPA wishes to pursue.”47  
 
C.  Justice Kagan’s Dissenting Opinion 
 
The dissent argued that the majority opinion mistakenly rested its 
rejection of the rule on the fact that the EPA did not overtly examine costs in the 
primary step of the regulatory process.48 The dissenting justices asserted that they 
would agree with the Court’s ruling if the EPA had actually and unequivocally 
ignored cost.49 However, they emphasized that while the analysis did not occur in 
the primary step of its deliberations, the EPA undoubtedly did consider cost.50 
Finding that not only did the EPA take an exhaustive and thorough look at costs, 
the dissent further stressed that the EPA “could not have measured costs at the 
process’s initial stage with any accuracy” due to the nature of the process.51 
While this process begins with the determination that regulation is “appropriate 
and necessary,” from there the EPA establishes emission limitations, an extensive 
procedure that takes years and examines cost.52 The dissent, asserting the EPA 
was reasonable in their consideration of the costs, comprehensively examined the 
regulatory process.53 The dissent found that at the end of this process, the EPA 
concluded that the advantages of the rule “far outweigh the costs.”54 Among 
other highlighted benefits, the EPA estimated there would be between 4,000 and 
11,000 fewer premature deaths caused by hazardous air pollutants annually if the 
rule were implemented.55 
According to the dissent, the only question was if the EPA reasonably 
organized this process. 56  The dissenting justices concluded that the EPA’s 
process made logical sense, and due to the plethora of factors meriting 
consideration under § 7412(n)(1), it was reasonable for EPA to break up the 
stages of its analysis to consider factors separately.57 Stating that the main defect 
in the majority’s opinion was that “it ignores everything but one thing EPA did,” 
the dissent recast the majority’s Ferrari metaphor.58 Instead of an irrational car 
purchaser who buys without checking the price, the dissent characterized the 
EPA as more like a car owner who determines “that it is ‘appropriate and 
necessary’ to replace her worn-out brake pads,” and when “faced with a serious 
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hazard and an available remedy, EPA moved forward like the sensible car owner, 
with a promise that it would, and well-grounded confidence that it could, take 
costs into account down the line.”59  
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
Though this case presents a setback for the EPA, it remains tasked with 
regulating hazardous-air pollutants produced from power plants. However, it 
must now adequately address costs in the first stages of determining if regulation 
is “appropriate and necessary.” Justice Thomas’s attack on Chevron deference, 
however, seems unlikely to gain significant traction, though, as this case 
demonstrates, Chevron deference to agency decisions may be growing less 
generous. The likely repercussions envisioned by the dissent focus not on judicial 
review, but environmental reality, and in doing so take a far darker turn. If this 
foreseen future comes to fruition, “the result is a decision that deprives the 
American public of the pollution control measures that the responsible Agency, 
acting well within its delegated authority, found would save many, many lives.”60 
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